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In this paper we focus on the agency of governments engaged in implementation 
processes which take place over a number of years and through multiple stages.  
The long timeframes associated with staged implementation leaves reforms 
vulnerable to the institutional effects that may ultimately derail policy 
aspirations.  Governments engaged in staged implementation need to be able to 
plan longitudinally; that is exercise foresight capacity (Dror, 2001; Kay and 
Ackrill, 2012; Wu, Howlett and Ramesh, 2018).  Governments also need to be 
capable of analysing whether staged implementation processes are creating 
endogenous sources of institutional change, and the likely impact of such change 
in the medium to long-term; that is governments need to be able to exercise 
reflective capacity (Kay and Ackrill, 2012).  In this paper we argue that being 
able to plan longitudinally and analyse the impacts of a staged implementation 
process are necessary, but not sufficient if long-term policy goals are to be 
realised.  Governments must also be able to navigate the inconsistent objectives 
that arise across the different stages of an implementation process by modifying 
implementation approaches in ways that reduce the likelihood of unwanted 
implementation effects occurring – what we have labeled ‘mitigation capacity’.   
 
We argue that mitigation capacity is dependent on reflective capacity and 
foresight, as well as the availability of relevant information.  The long-term 
nature of staged implementation processes means that, so long as policy goals 
and priorities remain relatively steady, there is time for evidence to emerge 
which strengthens policy-makers’ reflective capacity.  Thus, the temporal 
dimensions of staged implementation create tensions, but also provide 
opportunities for overcoming those tensions. 
 
The insights described in this paper emerged from analysis of the first three 
waves of data collected in a four year study of the implementation of Australia’s 
National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), a major social reform whose 
implementation is taking place over a seven year period with staged 
implementation (2013-2019).  The broad aim of this longitudinal study is to 
investigate how governance structures enable and/or constrain policy learning 
and change necessary for successful implementation of complex policy reforms.  
In this context, ‘successful implementation’ is defined as an implementation 
process which achieves the short-term implementation solutions needed to keep 
implementation processes moving forward, whilst retaining sufficient flexibility 
to meet long-term policy goals (Hill and Hupe, 2009; Nevile, Kay and Carey, 
2018).  Thus, the study contributes to how we understand policy and 
institutional change and the capacity of governments to balance short-term 
political demands and long-term policy goals.   
 
The relationship between structure and agency in public administration 
Debate over the extent to which governments are trapped by the legacies of 
policy design and implementation choices is not new.  Twenty years ago Hay and 
Wincott (1998, p.953) described the relationship between structure and agency 
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as “one of the perennial issues…of social science”, and suggested that “change 
occurs in (and through) the same time inter-relationship between strategic 
action and the strategic context within which it is conceived and instantiated, 
and in the later, unfolding of its intended and unintended consequences” (Hay 
and Wincott, 1998: 955).  In setting out their understanding of the relationship 
between structure and agency, Hay and Wincott (1998: 951) were concerned to 
focus attention on the need for historical institutionalism to consider the 
relationship between structure and agency “as a central analytic concern”.   
 
In the intervening years, debate has continued within the historical 
institutionalism literature, with some historical institutionalists arguing that 
complex policy structures emerge as a result of historical contingencies, which 
are then self-reinforcing, whereas for others, complex design is possible as a 
‘one-off’ at a certain point in time that lock-in options and trajectories for policy 
(Hall, 2016).  The historical institutionalism literature has tended to stress 
endogenous change, and evolving and co-evolving institutions through 
mechanisms of conversion, drift, and layering (Streeck and Thelen, 2005).  Below 
we briefly describe each of these mechanisms and the contexts in which they are 
currently thought to occur.  
 
Policy layering refers to the process by which new policy goals are added to 
existing policy rules or policy commitments without removing the existing rules 
or commitments (Béland, 2007, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005).  The effect of policy layering is to change the ways in which the 
original rules function and structure behaviour (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009; 
Streeck and Thelen, 2005). While layering does not introduce a whole new set of 
rules, it can have similar effects by altering the logic of institutions.  Mahoney 
and Thelen (2009) argue that layering takes place when bureaucratic actors lack 
the capacity to undertake a full restructure or removal of rules, instead they 
work within the existing system, adding or ‘tinkering’ with rules in place.  Drift 
occurs when rules are not formally changed, but their impacts change as a result 
of external conditions (for example, population demographics, or shifts in the 
power of dominant actors).  When the process of conversion takes place, rules 
stay the same, but become interpreted or enacted in new ways.  Conversion is 
thought to occur as a deliberate act, whereby individuals seek to exploit inherent 
ambiguities in institutions.  The end result of conversion can be a fundamentally 
changed, or new, institution (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009; Streeck and Thelen, 
2005).  
 
We argue that the capacity for intelligent policy design demands attention to the 
insights of historical institutionalism, such as layering, drift and conversion.  In 
thinking about policy design, there is no assumption that policy is made tabula 
rasa; in Richard Rose’s memorable phrase, policy-makers are inheritors more 
than they are choosers (Rose, 1990).  The aphorism of policy designers may well 
be: ‘I wouldn’t start from here’; but policy is still able to be designed using 
combinations of legacies.  In practice, policy design is always constrained, given 
it is about making choices in context (Ackrill and Kay, 2014).   
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The second generation of historical institutionalism literature argued that there 
is a role for creative agency and, critically, endogenous mechanisms of 
institutional change can be directed by policy-makers for particular purposes 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2009).  However, the historical institutionalism literature 
depicts policy layering as taking place only when institutional actors lack the 
capacity for formal rule change.  However, empirical research on policy design 
and implementation indicates that layering can be used as a tool, even when 
actors have the ability to make new institutional rules (see, for example, Carey, 
Kay and Nevile, 2017). 
 
Empirical findings which demonstrate how institutional actors consciously 
choose from a palette of options, rather than choosing the only option available 
to them, suggests the need for a more nuanced understanding of government 
agency such as can be found in the policy capacity literature which identifies 
foresight capacity, the ability to plan longitudinally (Dror, 2001; Kay and Ackrill, 
2012), and reflective capacity, the ability of public servants to monitor where 
they have come from, where they are going and how they might get there (Kay 
and Ackrill, 2012).  Reflective capacity is dependent upon the extent to which the 
policymaking system, “has access to, and can utilise, institutions that allow 
current policies to be critically examined” (Kay and Ackrill, 2012: 298).  
Foresight capacity and reflective capacity are particularly important when policy 
design and implementation takes place over a number of years because the 
potential for institutional effects, such as layering, which restrict subsequent 
policy choices are magnified.   For this reason we argue that foresight capacity 
and reflective capacity are necessary but not sufficient conditions if governments 
wish to reduce the risk of short-term implementation priorities creating legacies 
that work against the achievement of long-term policy goals.    
 
As well as being able to plan longitudinally and monitor the effects of current 
policy settings, governments need the capacity to identify corrective actions 
which will minimise the effects of unwanted policy outcomes; what we have 
labeled ‘mitigation capacity’.  This is not a concept that has appeared previously 
in the literature, however we believe it captures a key skill required for 
implementing long term policy goals. Mitigation capacity, as we define it, refers 
to the ability to navigate inconsistent objectives that arise across different 
timeframes. Without this, the desire to achieve short term policy goals can derail 
longer term ambitions.  As Hay and Wincott (1998: 956) observed, individuals 
(and groups of individuals) are reflexive and capable of assessing the immediate 
and unfolding impacts of prior strategies in relation to both short and long-term 
goals.   
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In this paper we use a historical institutionalist lens to examine an empirical case 
study of long-term policy implementation. From this, we identify the need for a 
range of policy capacities which need to be developed in order to balance short 
term and long-term policy goals. In the following section we outline the case 
which will be examined in this paper, followed by methods and analysis.  
 
The case study: The Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme 
The NDIS is the largest reform to public administration in Australia in a 
generation, and it is part of the international personalisation agenda (Dickinson 
and Glasby, 2008) that sees the delivery of welfare services both personalised 
and marketised. The AU$22billion scheme sees a shift from block-funded 
disability services to a personalised funding model for disability care.  
 
The NDIS is said to replace an inequitable and fractured system (Productivity 
Commission, 2011; Collings, Dew and Dowse, 2016). Previously, Australian 
disability services were the responsibility of State and Territory governments, 
and different models have been developed across the eight jurisdictions (Fisher, 
2010).  In 2011, the Australian Productivity Commission (an independent 
statutory body) was charged with investigating the organization and funding of 
disability services and developing a design for a national disability insurance 
scheme. The Commission found that the existing system was ‘underfunded, 
unfair, fragmented, and inefficient, and gives people with a disability little choice 
and no certainty of access to appropriate supports’ (Productivity Commission, 
2011, p.2).  The report set out the design for a market-based social insurance 
scheme: the NDIS. The NDIS was passed into legislation with bi-partisan support 
in 2013 and broad public support, with the Productivity Commission report 
forming the blueprint for design and – to a lesser degree - implementation (Thill, 
2015).  
 
Under the NDIS, approximately 460 000 individuals who have a significant and 
permanent disability will receive personalized funding budgets, paid for by the 
state, to fund their care (Productivity Commission, 2011; Collings, Dew and 
Dowse, 2016). Compared to other personalisation schemes, for example in the 
UK, which took thirty years to implement, the Australian scheme is being 
implemented at the rapid and almost unprecedented rate of seven years, with all 
eligible Australians due to be signed up to the scheme by 2019 after a phased 
implementation that began in 2013 (Carey et al., 2018).  
 
Implementation began in seven trial sites around the country, each with a 
different population focus. It then proceeded to ‘transition’ in which enrollment 
in the scheme is expected to grow to include all eligible citizens, who will be 
placed on initial (yet to be developed) service plans while old supports are 
dismantled, and ‘full scheme’ where all participants are enrolled and have a 
sophisticated plan (Productivity Commission, 2011, 2017). While phasing was 
envisaged as a way to manage the scope of change, it has left the scheme 
vulnerable to being ‘caught’ at different stages (Carey, Kay and Nevile, 2017) The 
scope combined with the short timeframe and the phased approach of this 





Research design and methods 
As noted earlier, this paper draws on data from a longitudinal study of the 
implementation of the NDIS.  The study aims to investigate implementation with 
a particular focus on how governance structures enable and/or constrain policy 
learning and change necessary for successful implementation of complex policy 
reforms.  The study utilizes a case study research design because it enabled us to 
investigate these changes in-depth and in their real-life contexts over time (Yin, 
2014).  Semi-structured interviews (N=58) were conducted with key 
policymakers in the Commonwealth government department with policy 
responsibility for the design and implementation of the NDIS over a period of 
three years to capture change over time. 
 
Participants were identified by the head of the Commonwealth department as 
key to the implementation of the NDIS. In total, 41 participants were 
interviewed, Six participants have taken part in all three rounds of data 
collection, while other participants have only taken part in one or two 
interviews, depending on when they started or left their role.  The NDIS branch 
of the Commonwealth Department of Social Services (DSS) has expanded 
considerably since the research began, bringing new participants into the study, 
while others have moved on reflecting the natural movements in the Australian 
Public Service .  
 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Each round of interviews 
focused on current implementation challenges, guided by participants and their 
work. The first round of interviews took place in March/April 2016.  Themes, 
generated by participants, with each interview commencing with the interviewer 
asking participants to reflect on current challenges and opportunities. In the first 
round of interviews discussed: decisions regarding the governance structure of 
the NDIS; deviations from the structure proposed by the Productivity 
Commission in its report, Disability care and support; and the impact of the newly 
elected Liberal-National Coalition Government on the design and 
implementation of the NDIS.  The second round of interviews took place in 
April/May 2017 and focused on the interrelated issues of market development, 
regulation and accountability which was the main focus of implementation at 
this time.  The third round of interviews took place in April 2018 and focused on 
the nature of the relationship between the National Disability Insurance Agency 
(NDIA) and the newly operational NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission as 
well as evolution in thinking in relation to market development.   
 
Data was analysed using a thematic approach (Blaikie, 2010).  ‘Like’ data were 
grouped together to form categories and subcategories.  These categories were 
developed into more substantive themes, by linking and drawing connections 
between initial categories and hypothesizing about consequences and likely 
explanations for the appearance of certain phenomena (Strauss, 1987). This was 
done through discussion between the team.  In the refining of themes, selective 
coding was carried out, whereby transcripts were revisited with the explicit 
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intent of finding further linkages and connections between the central issue 
being explored and other themes.  
 
Findings 
As noted previously, the blueprint for the implementation of the NDIS set out 
three stages: a trial phase where implementation of specific cohorts commenced 
in seven locations across Australia; a transition phase during which time 
enrolment of eligible participants was expected to grow from 20,000 to 460,000 
and ‘full scheme’ operation, by which time it was anticipated that all eligible 
participants would be enrolled in the Scheme.  As the NDIS approaches full 
scheme, a fourth stage has emerged, with a distinction being drawn between ‘full 
scheme’ and ‘scheme maturity’.   
 
I think we have in the last year come to the realisation that we see a 
difference between full scheme and mature scheme.  So we have full 
scheme agreements and that basically happens when we agree transition 
ends and there is a new funding mechanism where we lock things in 
based on a per population basis.  But we know that the work for the NDIS 
is not [finished] when we’ve got full scheme agreements because there is 
a great deal to be done in the maturation of the scheme, particular 
markets and workforce, because…we think [these issues] will pose 
continual risks to how things roll out (Senior public servant P33 2018).   
 
Because of the roll out … three models are being designed. So you were 
really using trial to experiment… And then you’ve got this disruptor in the 
middle where you need a rapid intake process, where you actually need 
elements of the model designed differently, just for transition (Senior 
public servant P21 2016). 
 
 
As implementation has proceeded through the trial and transition phases, senior 
public servants responsible for managing the staged implementation were aware 
that decisions being made in response to short-term implementation priorities 
had the potential to create unwanted policy legacies.  
  
You also want to make sure that things in transition don’t leave a legacy in 
full scheme that is a bit hard to unpick, because you’ve got to do [certain] 
things in transition (Senior public servant P3 2016).   
 
So there’ll still be an evolution but I think one of the big changes we’ve 
seen is a lot of things that were operating in trial were never going to be 
scalable for transition to full scheme (Senior public servant P13 2017). 
 
In our analysis, tensions between the short-term priorities of staged 
implementation and long-term goals of the Scheme where legacies had the 
potential to become entrenched were found to be particularly acute in four key 
areas: participant planning, funding mechanisms, the establishment of markets 
for disability support service; and national consistency.  Each of these areas are 
discussed in turn before attention turns to the ways in which those responsible 
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for on-going implementation are able to negotiate tensions between short-term 
implementation priorities and long-term goals. 
 
 
Participant planning   
One of the major innovations of the NDIS is the creation of ‘Local Area 
Coordinators’ (LACs).  In the original blueprint for the Scheme, the role of LACs 
was to provide local level support by linking people with disability to local 
community groups, providing small grants to assist individuals access 
community activities, identifying voluntary resources people with disability 
could access, as well as case management and brokerage functions (Productivity 
Commission, 2011).  However the shape of this important ‘street level’ role has 
undergone significant change as the Scheme has moved through its various 
implementation phases.   
 
As noted previously, the aim of the transition phase was to increase enrolments 
in the Scheme from 20,000 to 460,000.  Not surprisingly, implementation 
priorities centred on getting participants enrolled and drawing up personalised 
budget plans as quickly as possible, with less consideration given to the quality 
of the personalised budget  plans (Knaus, 2017).  The focus on increasing 
enrolments as quickly as possible was driven by political imperatives: 
 
I think it was pretty much a politically-driven thing and there were 
several times where we asked questions like, ‘Do you really want to stick 
to these numbers? They’re unrealistic?’  And the political response, 
because there was probably a fear of being seen to be slowing down, or 
not being supportive of the NDIS and the Opposition [Party] getting 
political capital out of it, I think the answer was, ‘no, we’re sticking to the  
numbers. You just got to make it happen’ (Senior public servant P28 
2018).  
 
To reach the targets LACs were redirected away from their original role of 
providing local level support and required to focus their attention on enrolling 
participants and placing them on plans (Senior public servants P18, P28).   This 
occurred through a process of policy conversion – with LACs being outsourced 
by an incoming government, the ambiguity around their function was exploited 
to cover the shortfall of planners. This is reflected in LAC contracts, which now 
stipulate that at least 80 per cent of their time should be spent on planning 
activities, as distinct from their original planned activities (NDIA, 2016, 2016) 
which were intended to help participants build capacity by accessing  local 
services (Senior public servant P18).  The change in LAC roles was noted in 
recent research evaluating aspects of the scheme.  
 
LACs are… not doing what they were employed to do. Many felt the 
specific skills and connections to the community that they brought to the 
position were not being utilised. All of the LACs who were interviewed 
described being required to spend the largest portion of their time 
supporting the planning process and plan implementation  
(Mavromaras et al, 2018: 107). 
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While it is anticipated that, in time, LACs will return to their original roles, 
planning within the NDIS is currently fraught, with financial cuts to the amount 
of money available to participants and major inconsistencies in care plans on 
both a case-by-case and year-by-year basis (Commonwealth Ombudsman, 2018; 
Joint Standing Committee on the NDIS, 2018). The Commonwealth Ombudsman 
found that the NDIS had around 8,100 requests for revisions or alterations to 
NDIS care plans in February 2018, with around 600 new requests occurring per 
week at that time (Commonwealth Ombudsman, 2018). There was significant 
attention on the NDIS’s plan revision process at this time, with media 
highlighting the backlog and the Ombudsman’s report recording 400 complaints 
relating to the plan revision process (Commonwealth Ombudsman, 2018). This 
has the potential to erode community trust in the planning process and lessen 
the ability of the LACS, who have become the face of the planning process in 
many locations, to fulfil the original vision of their role. 
 
 
Policymakers also noticed a change in the culture of the Scheme as a result of the 
pressure to enroll participants and place them on plans as quickly as possible.  In 
the following quote the interviewee refers to ‘Centrelink’, a Federal government 
agency whose main responsibility is to process social security payments.  In 
many locations NDIA offices are co-located with Centrelink offices.  The 
comparison of the NDIS to Centrelink demonstrates the concern felt by many 
both inside and outside the bureaucracy that the NDIS planning process was 
becoming standardized and de-personalised.  
 
You could see a shift in culture from a philosophy that was individually 
needs-focused to almost a Centrelink kind of focus and … now … it’s 
moved totally to a Centrelink - a sausage factory - approach (Senior public 
servant P28 2018). 
 
One of the downsides of this focus on targets has been…a shifting in 
emphasis in the whole basic focus of the NDIS. So initially it was 
conceived as very much tailored to the individual and their 
circumstances, and really understanding their circumstances, and 
developing a particular package for the person. And I think the pressure 
of just get through hundreds of people has kind of shifted it from that 
emphasis. And I think there's a real danger for the NDIS that it basically 
turns into Centrelink (Senior public servant P28 2017). 
 
 
A review was launched in recognition of the drift that occurred in NDIS planning 
– away from the individualised vision, towards a ‘sausage factory’ or ‘cookie 
cutter’ model where the goals of assessing individual needs and aspirations were 
standardised and streamlined in order to meet participant enrolment targets. 
The Pathways Review identified the policy drift in the planning process as the 
NDIS was implemented, as a result of pressure on the scheme. 
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From the commencement of transition in July 2016 and as the number of 
participants entering the Scheme ramped up, it became obvious that the 
NDIA’s processes and systems had not always resulted in a participant 
and provider experience of a consistently high standard. Systems and 
processes migrated to at transition posed Information and 
Communication Technology challenges. This combined with the use of 
telephone contact to develop participant plans and the very pace of 
participants entering the Scheme collectively caused many participants 
and providers to report poor plan experiences (NDIA, 2018a, p.8). 
 
The review identified that participants wanted the planning process and LACs to 
be returned to the original vision of the NDIS. 
 
Participants told the NDIA that they did not feel engaged in the process of 
developing their plans, experiences were inconsistent and they had to 
retell their stories to different people. Participants wanted more of a 
relationship of trust built through face-to-face interaction; they wanted 
the NDIA staff and LACs to understand their individual needs; they 
needed clear communication in a format that suited their individual 
needs; they required greater consideration of other government and 
community supports in their plans; and they looked for systems that were 
user friendly (NDIA, 2018a, p.9). 
 
 
A combination of policy drift (with the planning process moving away from the 
more bespoke and developmental approach) and conversion (with LACs 
diverted from community development to planning) puts the long-term goals of 
the NDIS at risk. The original LAC role is fundamental to the long-term goals of 
the scheme to see individuals with a disability empowered and well connected to 
their communities, exercising choice and control over services. In diverting LACs 
into planning in the midst of widespread discontent with the planning process, 
these professionals lose community and participant trust. Moreover, the 
structures and culture of the NDIS may become cemented in ways that do not 
allow the LAC role to return to the original vision – leaving it permanently 
converted to a planning role. The potential for this was noted by one 
policymaker in 2016. 
 
There will be a bit more of a juggling of the general Local Area 
Coordination stuff, and assisting the claiming and bringing people in. You 
would hope then in three years’ time, LACs can go to that real intent much 
more because people will be in and actually looking at how the 
community supports them, how are the linkages with mainstream…So, to 
me there’s a risk in these things - and in some ways I think that’s why the 
transition of only two or three years is a good thing - because it’s really 
hard, once you’ve done things, to sort of pull back. There will need to be 
some pragmatic approaches in transition but not locked in (Senior public 
servant P21 2016). 
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Now, three years after this statement was made, the LACs are in fact further 
away from fulfilling their community development roles, with planning roles 





In transitioning from a State funded to a federally funded approach those 
responsible for policy design and implementation have been obliged to create a 
range of interim measures which leave a legacy on subsequent stages of 
implementation.  For example, existing services offered either by State and 
Territory governments directly, or through contracts between State and 
Territory governments and third party providers, have continued through all 
stages of implementation. The agreement negotiated between the 
Commonwealth government and the various State and Territory governments 
which allowed implementation to commence, requires participants to use State 
and Territory funded services (referred to as ‘in-kind’ services) before ‘cash’ 
services where individuals are given money to purchase alternatives from the 
market.  This is a form of policy layering where new policy goals are layered onto 
an old arrangement, thereby compromising the goals of the reform.  What is 
particularly interesting about this example is the way in which layering was 
sought out as a tool to deal with complexity rather than policy makers choosing 
to introduce a completely new set of rules (Carey et al, 2017).  That is, the 
requirement for participants to source support services from existing State and 
Territory contracts until such contracts expire, was introduced in order to meet 
the short-term priority of managing the financial transition from State and 
Territory governments to the Commonwealth government.  
 
[The States] need to use the in-kind services above cash, because if they 
don’t, the in-kind services might disappear…. But that puts pressure on 
the cash. I think that is a really huge challenge and something if you're 
looking at from an implementation perspective, is very difficult to 
administer. Now the reason we’ve got in-kind is to help us transition out 
of the existing contracts, but that can take years (Senior public servant  
P14 2016). 
 
However, the requirement for individuals to continue to use existing government 
services limits both choice and control for participants and, over time, retards 
the growth of the disability services market.   
 
By using in-kind, you’re also restricting choice and control of the 
participations, because you're saying, ‘well we've still got this service that 
we’re going to have for the next three years, as a contract’. So although 
we’re telling you, ‘you can go and get whatever provider you want’, you 
actually have to use this [provider] first because otherwise we’ll run out of  
money (Senior public servant P14 2016). 
 
Many of these ‘in-kind’ arrangements will stay in place into full implementation 
(Senior public servant P14) . 
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In the most recent interviews, three years after the above statements were made 
by policymakers, there is a growing recognition that this policy layering is 
creating a legacy of distortions that could be difficult, or at least take 
considerable time, to ‘wash out’. This is one of the reasons why policymakers are 
envisaging a fourth stage of implementation – ‘scheme maturity’- whereby 
market distortions and constraints on choice and control created by layered 
effects of previous policies, begin to dissolve. In recognition of the ways in which 
layering is now impacting the growth of markets and the vision of choice and 
control, the Federal government has tried to wrap-up the in-kind contributions 
by making it non-negotiable “that in-kind needs to come out of the scheme. 
There’s a few areas, as you will have heard, where we’re looking at the form that 
that might take, but the Commonwealth’s pretty committed that there’ll be no in-
kind…[beyond] 2023 (Senior public servant P31 2018). 
 
However, 2023 is well into the fourth stage of ‘full scheme’ implementation. The 
hangover effects in terms of market development and the ability of individuals to 
exercise choice and control will have gone well past transition, placing limits on 
market development and also the development of capabilities of individuals to 
exercise choice and control (rather than continue to receive standard 
government services). Hence, while the in-kind arrangement met the immediate 
priority of managing the financial transition from State and Territory 
governments to the Federal government, it also has the potential to entrench 
expectations, practices and cultures that are inconsistent with the ultimate goals 
of the NDIS.  
 
Disability markets 
The success of the NDIS hinges on development of robust disability markets 
across the country, as without multiple care options for participants to choose 
from, they cannot exercise choice and control over their care services. The 
establishment and maintenance of markets for disability support services relies 
on participants having funds to purchase services, thereby creating demand and 
driving provider growth in the markets (Productivity Commission, 2011).   
 
During transition, the scheme has been characterised by higher numbers of 
participants and larger funding packages than anticipated in early modeling 
(Productivity Commission, 2017). While the scheme remains within its budget 
envelope, this is because participants have not utilised the full funding within 
their plans (Productivity Commission, 2017), highlighting a major budgetary 
problem within the NDIS.  Lack of spending of care plan budgets is no doubt 
driven by a range of factors, however a lack of markets from which to purchase 
services have been identified as major cause of participants not spending their 
allocated budgets (Productivity Commission, 2017).  
 
In response to pressures to keep the NDIS within the current funding allotment, 
underspent money in plans has been withdrawn from participants’ budgets 
(Morton, 2017). Similarly, while there is no systematic evidence, there are 
reports in the media that participants’ plans are being reduced over time, 
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particularly if people are perceived to be doing well (Morton, 2017). One 
interviewee explained her personal experience of this: 
I’ve got a friend who’s in her mid 50s.  She has a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia and 12 months ago she had been given 12 hours of NDIS 
care a week and that meant that pretty much every second day she had 
someone coming in for social support.  She was… in a little bedsit, and she 
was functioning really well, probably the best that she had been in more 
than 10 years.  Anyway, her review came up and, because she was doing 
so well, her 12 hours went to one hour.  So literally what had been built 
up for her over the past couple of years just went out the window within 
less than two months. The social support was totally withdrawn (Senior 
public servant P40 2018). 
 
Pulling unspent money back into the scheme, and reducing people’s packages 
over time, meets the immediate demands on the NDIS to rapidly reduce costs 
and prevent a budget blowout.  However, it places longer-term goals in jeopardy 
– without money in the hands of participants there is no means by which to 
stimulate market growth. This can be considered a form of policy drift.  If the 
service markets do not develop as a result of a lack of funds to stimulate growth, 
the NDIS will fail to deliver on choice and control (Productivity Commission, 
2017). 
 
Emerging efforts to address market problems may also generate undesirable 
side effects. For example, in South Australia a public sector mutual has been 
established by public servants to address a current market gap in child 
therapeutic care (Easton, 2018). In doing so, the immediate gap has been 
addressed. However, in the longer term, the mutual may play a monopoly role in 
the market and prevent this area of care from becoming contestable.  At present, 
the implications of these approaches are not known.  
 
National consistency 
One of the original aims of the NDIS was to create a national scheme supported 
by the Commonwealth government with consistency across individual States and 
Territories (Productivity Commission, 2011), thereby ensuring equitable 
treatment of people with disability across Australia.   
 
It is definitely a goal under the NDIS to achieve national consistency, 
particularly in respect of the policies and the objects and principles of the 
Act, the principles of choice and control, reasonable and necessary access 
requirements (Senior public servant P22 2016). 
 
National consistency in the scheme and therefore national consistency in 
decision making around the scheme and what people are able to 
access…[and] how that’s delivered (Senior public servant P8 2016). 
 
In order to transition the diverse range of State based models that have emerged 
over the last twenty years into a single national scheme, a series of bi-lateral 
agreements were developed for each State and Territory at each stage of 
implementation.  These bi-lateral agreements both introduce and codify policy 
 13 
layering.  During the transition phase of implementation there was recognition 
that different arrangements will apply in different States and Territories, despite 
the desire for national consistency. 
 
I think there’s a recognition that there’s that need for national 
consistency. There’s going to be an awkward year, probably next year 
where the phasing in is commencing with South Australia and New South 
Wales, because of that link to the bilateral agreements in those two 
jurisdictions (Senior public servant P36 2018). 
 
However, differences still exist between States, even in the third round of 
bilateral agreements.  This means that the legacies of former disability models 
will endure into full scheme, creating variations which  may prevent national 
consistency from being achieved.  For example, in Western Australia the Scheme 
is delivered under State legislation (not Federal legislation, as is the case 
elsewhere in the country) and administered through a different implementation 
agency governed by an independent Western Australia Board (Buckmaster, 
2017).  Here the short-term priority has been to shift from a State to a Federal 
model, which required significant negotiations, and different compromises, with 
each State and Territory.  In the long-term, this raises the possibility that the 
Scheme will look different in different States and Territories.  The practical 
implication of this will be that, should participants move interstate, they may 
experience differences in their care planning processes and rules, a situation the 




While staged implementation is set out as a process by which to instigate and 
scale up reforms, the experiences of implementing the NDIS has involved three 
(and potentially four) distinct stages with different structures, values and 
objectives.  This is in contrast to the rationale provided for the staged approach, 
which is presented as a natural continuum from trial to full implementation 
(Productivity Commission, 2011).  This is, in part, an issue of policy design.  The 
trial sites of the NDIS all operated under different models, with different priority 
populations and different operational arrangements.  As such, a feasible ‘scale 
up’ process was doubtful.  However, a range of policy legacies and emerging 
political interests also contributed to the ‘stickiness’ of transition phases.  In 
some instances these legacies were deliberately created in order to address 
political and implementation pressures. The development and use of policy 
legacies in implementation offers insights and warning to those interested in 
large-scale policy change in other jurisdictions. While the experiences of the 
NDIS overall demonstrate the need for policymakers to develop a range of 
capacities relating to the temporal dimensions of policy implementation.  
 
The experiences of policymakers charged with implementing the NDIS 
demonstrate that phased implementation poses the risk of policies being pulled 
off course during transition phases, thereby inhibiting the implementation of the 
long-term policy vision. We found that in a number of key areas the need to meet 
short-term priorities, which were often political in nature, set in motion the 
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creation of structures and cultures which are likely to become entrenched. 
Indeed, the longitudinal nature of the study has enabled us to show that some 
changes are indeed becoming intractable. Three years ago, interviewees raised 
concerns about LACs (Local Area Coordinators) becoming ‘locked’ into planning 
roles and in 2018 we find that planning now takes up 80 per cent of LACs’ time 
and has been written into contracts. Phased implementation may help 
policymakers negotiate the enormity of large-scale change, whereby ambiguous 
or incomplete policy ideas become a way to navigate immediate implementation 
concerns. However, the NDIS demonstrates that the risk of policies becoming 
stuck in early implementation stages is genuine and material.  
 
To avoid this, policymakers need to identify where processes such as drift 
layering and conversion are occurring, and determining strategies to mitigate 
their impacts. This requires policymakers to develop a range of policy capacities 
with a sensitivity to the temporal dimensions of policy, in particular, foresight 
capacity, reflective capacity and mitigation capacity.  In the remainder of the we 
discuss each of these in turn. 
 
The ability to plan longitudinally, or use foresight capacity, is seen as a key 
capacity of government (Dror, 2001; Kay and Ackrill, 2012). Governments have 
come under scrutiny and criticism in this area, largely as a result of the short-
termism created by fixed political terms (Kay and Ackrill, 2012). Political 
pressures are indeed responsible for some implementation challenges within the 
NDIS. For example, the pressure on planning which has seen critical positions 
diverted has largely been driven by political desires to not be seen to be slowing 
down such an important reform (Knaus, 2017; Nevile, Kay and Carey, 2018). This 
demonstrates the ways in which political pressures can intersect with phased 
implementation to pull reforms in different directions. Several authors have 
noted the lack of attention to the interplay of politics and implementation in the 
policy implementation literature (Moe, 1989; Nevile, Kay and Carey, 2018; 
Patashnik, 2008). However, as Moe (1989 p268) argues, policy implementation 
cannot be separated from politics – “guided by technical criteria of efficiency and 
effectiveness”. Nevile (et al 2018) has demonstrated the way that government 
departments, agencies and positions are structured is both a political instrument 
and an implementation mechanism. Hence, public servants need to grapple with 
the ways in which politics may interrupt long term policy implementation 
through shifting the structures or cultures of institutions. For example, with the 
NDIS the public eye has been on the overall cost of the scheme. In response, the 
costs of the scheme have been carefully maintained, while politically motivated 
changes have been made which effect implementation (Carey et al., 2017). These 
include the change to Local Coordinator Roles and a decision to outsource a 
range of functions to non-government agencies (Bo’sher, 2015; Carey et al., 
2017). Here the structure and governance of the scheme has been altered for 
political reasons with consequences for implementation – demonstrating, as 
Nevile et al (2018) argue, that it is not a case of either/or but both.  
 
In the third round of interviews, we found evidence of foresight capacity in that 
there was a growing recognition that the requirement to use existing State and 
Territory government contracts (in kind services) was creating a legacy of 
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distortions that could be difficult, or at the very least, take some time to  ‘wash 
out’ of the system.  This is one of the reasons why policymakers are now talking 
about a fourth stage of implementation – scheme maturity – whereby market 
distortions and constraints on choice and control by layered effects of previous 
policies begin to dissolve.   
 
The case of the NDIS also raises other fundamental questions about the ability 
and need for governments to plan long term. Phased implementation is an effort 
to grapple with the temporal and logistical complexities of large-scale reform. 
Yet, signaling that a policy will be ‘mature’ in the future gives public servants 
room to move in the present – limitations or problems are more tolerable in the 
present because they are part of achieving the full vision of reform. Hence, rather 
than merely a tool to map out future policy steps, phased implementation may 
actually allow policymakers to leave some complexities unchallenged and 
unaddressed. Phased implementation needs to account for, not side step, these 
issues through foresight and long term planning. A key part of this is the ability 
to foresee endogenous sources of institutional change, such as the stickiness of 
institutional layers (seen in the NDIS in funding mechanisms) and drift or 
conversion (seen in the Local Area Coordinator positions). The longitudinal 
nature of our research captures the early awareness of NDIS policymakers to 
these issues, suggesting that they can be anticipated and, potentially, managed.  
 
Reflective capacity is concerned with the ability of public servants to continually 
monitor where they have come from, where they are going and how they might 
get there (Kay and Ackrill, 2012). The extent to which the policy-making system 
“has access to, and an utilise, institutions that allow current policies to be 
critically examined, to look back to recover historical lessons … to maintain or 
restore travel towards far-distant goals, is constitutive of policy capacity” (Kay 
and Ackrill, 2012).  Reflective capacity is in fact an essential part of government’s 
steering and stewarding role – gauging whether policies are on track and 
determining how to bring them back on course if not.  
 
The NDIS case highlights the importance of reflective capacity for identifying and 
ameliorating processes of institutional change with could entrench reforms in 
early phases.  For example, interviewees have always been aware that the 
success of the NDIS depends upon the development of a robust market in 
disability services, but little agreement on what should be done to monitor and 
facilitate market development  (Nevile et al., 2019; Carey et al., 2017). However, 
by the third round of interviews, there was evidence of reflective capacity, rather 
than just recognition of a potential problem. For example, with the NDIS Quality 
and Safeguards Commission in operation, there is evidence of an understanding 
about the sort of information sharing between the National Disability Agency 
(the main implementation body) and the Commission, which will enable the two 
agencies to recognise potential risks and take action to reduce the possibility of 
unwanted outcomes. This includes identifying the potential exist of a large 
provider,  or identify risky providers operating in the scheme (Commonwealth 
Department of Family and Community Services, 2016; Joint Standing Committee 
on the NDIS, 2018).  
 
 16 
Similarly, policymakers noted the potential for cultures and practices to become 
stuck in transition phases, but there was evidence of some attempts to redress 
issues of layering and drift in response. While the ‘Pathways Review’ (NDIA, 
2018b) of the planning process has been contentious, it is nonetheless an effort 
to set implementation back on track – redressing a “sausage factory” culture that 
had emerged in the main implementation agency and return the planning 
process to the original vision. While the review was only launched this year, its 
success or failure will tell us much about the capability of governments to 
redirect implementation once processes of layering, drift and conversion have 
been identified.  
 
At the core of the challenges within the implementation of the NDIS is the ability 
to navigate inconsistent objectives, referred to here as mitigation capacity. While 
Painter and Pierre (2005) describe the need to balance conflicting goals and 
objectives as a political problem, the NDIS demonstrates that it is also a temporal 
challenge.  
 
While staged implementation is set out as a process by which to instigate and 
scale up reforms, the experiences of implementing the NDIS has been three (and 
potentially four) distinct phases with different structures, values and objectives. 
This is in contrast to the rationale provided for the phased approach, which 
presents it as a natural continuum from trial to full implementation (Productivity 
Commission, 2011). This is in part an issue of policy design. The trial sites of the 
NDIS all operated under different models, with different priority populations and 
different existing contexts (Productivity Commission, 2011; Commonwealth 
Department of Family and Community Services, 2016). As such, a ‘scale up’ 
process was doubtful. However, a range of policy legacies and emerging political 
interests also contributed to the ‘stickiness’ of transition phases. Moreover, these 
legacies have also been used as an implementation tool, which can be seen in the 
use of in-kind funding supports and also a deferral to business as usual 
approaches to participant planning in order to address political and 
implementation pressure (Carey, Kay and Nevile, 2017). 
 
While foresight capacity is an attempt to predict future problems, and reflective 
capacity to learn from past ones, mitigation capacity refers to the ability of 
governments to navigate real time decisions where conflicting goals are present. 
The NDIS suggests that this mitigation capacity is critical regarding large scale 
policy reforms, where there are likely to be conflicts between immediate 
objectives and longer term aims. Without mitigation capacity, processes of 
institutional layering and path dependency that come into play in any large-scale 
efforts to change institutions may render governments incapable of seeing 
reforms through to their full vision. Hence, mitigation capacity is important for 
any government and/or policymaker seeking to achieve long-term goals in policy 
reform.  
 
Analysis of the NDIS case suggests that when governments exercise mitigation 
capacity, they tend to do so in a piecemeal manner. That is, by addressing some, 
but not all, of the factors that have the potential to produce an unwanted 
outcome.  For example, a number of mitigation strategies are under 
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consideration in the area of market development, but there is an hesitancy on 
the part of policy makers to address what service providers identify as the major 
barrier to market development; namely that price regulation by the NDIA is 
“preventing the development of the market [and] threatening the financial 
viability of many organisations” (Joint Standing Committee on the NDIS, 2018, 
p.65). This is because of the perceived need for independence in the setting of 
prices for the scheme (Productivity Commission, 2017). The experience of the 
NDIS suggests that mitigation capacity is an area which requires explicit 
development, though it is worth noting that mitigation capacity may be 






Staged implementation is a used as a tool by government to manage large scale 
policy change, particularly where time frames are long. Using the case study of 
the Australian NDIS we have explored the difficultly of balancing short-term 
implementation solutions while retaining the freedom and flexibility to meet 
long-term desired policy outcomes in staged implementation approaches. By 
applying a historical institutionalist lens, it is apparent that a range of policy 
capacities are important in long-term policymaking which can help draw 
policymakers’ attention to temporal dimensions of implementation. Many of the 
challenges identified in the NDIS, relating to layering, conversion and drift, are 
inherent in all long-term policy aspirations, and historical institutionalism 
reveals a number of concepts common to policy change worldwide that should 
be considered at the point of policy design and beyond. This can ensure that 
short-term thinking is not to the detriment of long-term policy aspirations.  
 
We have argued that the literature on historical institutionalism indicates a 
number of key areas of policy capacity that need to be better developed in long 
term policy objectives are to be reached:  foresight and reflective capacity (which 
are already described in the literature), and mitigation capacity, a concept 
introduced here. Being able to plan longitudinally and analyse the impacts of a 
staged implementation process are necessary, but not sufficient if long-term 
policy goals are to be realised.  Governments must also be able to navigate the 
inconsistent objectives that arise across the different stages of an 
implementation process by modifying implementation approaches in ways that 
reduce the likelihood of unwanted implementation effects occurring, that is 
develop ‘mitigation capacity’.   
 
This paper has highlighted the importance of developing a range of temporal 
capacities, for policy design and implementation. This is because historical 
institutionalism has demonstrated that early policy decisions and practices can 
become intractable norms over time (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), turning a 
short-term solution into a long-term policy misalignment. However, capacity for 
intelligent policy design and implementation may be possible when these key 
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